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Abstract

The paper develops a two-country endogenous growth model to
investigate possible causes for the existence and persistence of
productivity growth differentials between nations despite a common
technology, constant returns to scale and perfect international capital
mobility.

Private consumption is derived from a three-period overlapping

generations specification.
The source of productivity (growth) differentials in our model is the
existence of a non-traded capital good ('human capital') whose
augmentation requires a non-traded current input (time spent by the young
in education rather than leisure).
We consider the influence on productivity growth differentials of
private thrift, public debt, the taxation of capital and savings and of
policy towards human capital formation.
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(1) INTRODUCTION.

This paper develops a simple two-country growth model to investigate
possible causes for the existence and persistence of differences in average
labor productivity! between countries and regions despite a common global
technology, non-increasing returns to scale and unrestricted international
mobility of financial capital.

The model can either be viewed as an

endogenous growth version of the two-country overlapping generations (OLG)
neoclassical growth model of Buiter [1981, 1989], Frenkel and Razin [1987],
and Buiter and Kletzer [1990a,b]

2,

or as a two-country, OLG 3 , constant

returns to scale version of one of the models belonging to the class discussed
1n Lucas [1988].
Our choice of an OLG consumption structure is motivated by our desire to
include deficit financing and intergenerational redistribution among the
fiscal policies we analyze.

Our OLG consumption structure implies that there

is no first-order debt neutrality.

Government borrowing with debt service

financed through taxes on the younger generations will therefore tend to crowd
out domestic saving.

In our model it will also be shown to influence domestic

human capital formation, although generally in the opposite direction from its
effect on saving.

The OLG structure also permits one to consider the

implications of constant but internationally different time preference rates,
without this inevitably implying asymptotic ownership of all global financial
wealth by the residents of a single country.

Alogoskoufis and van der Ploeg

(1991], independently developed a two-country endogenous growth OLG model with
perfect international capital mobility.
Even with a balanced budget the government can influence domestic
physical capital formation directly by varying the marginal tax rates on the
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capital income of firms.

To the extent that this influences the interest

rate, such policies will also indirectly influence household saving and human
capital formation.

The government can also influence the domestic

accumulation of human capital directly (and with a balanced budget) by varying
the marginal tax rate on non-human asset income earned by households4~
Many current models investigate differences in long-run economic
performance between national economies.

In much of the endogenous growth

literature the same technology (generally summarized 1n a production function)
is assumed to be available to each national economy.

With the exception of

Alogoskoufis and van der Ploeg, who assume perfect international financial
capital mobility, that part of the endogenous growth literature that
explicitly models a multi-country world assumes complete financial autarky: no
international lending and borrowing (or direct international investment)
occur.

In addition, labor (and population in its other aspects, that of

consumers and portfolio holders) is also assumed to be internationally
immobile

56.

We maintain the assumption of immobile labor in our model.

With·

financial autarky, differences in national saving rates will be translated
into long-run differences in national productivity levels for exogenous growth
models and into differences in national productivity levels and growth rates for
endogenous growth models.
The recent literature on international trade and growth considers cases
in which there may or may not be direct technology transfer (instantaneous or
gradual) and trade in intermediate inputs

7•

The technological assumptions made in this paper (constant returns to
reproducible factors) permit "endogenous growth".

The key points of the paper

would, however, hold true even if the global technology only permitted
exogenous (long-run) growth as is the case in much of the growth theory of the
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fifties and sixties (see e.g. Solow [1956, 1970]).

In that case (long-run)

equalization of productivity growth rates would be assured automatically, and
the "bite" of the assumptions of a shared global technology and perfect
financial capital mobility would be in the prediction of convergence of kvels
of output per worker.
Under the assumptions of free international technology transfer, free
international financial capital mobility and no non-traded productive inputs,
many of the existing exogenous and endogenous growth models would imply global
convergence of output per worker

8•

Differences in national savings rates

would not account for differences in national rates of accumulation of
augmentable factors.

In the simplest version of the model (absent_.adjustment

costs) convergence would be immediate: any country could import Japanese-style
levels and growth rates of output per person-hour overnight.

The class of

models to which this global convergence result applies includes all those for
which the common aggregate national (or regional9) production function
exhibits constant or decreasing returns10 to internationally mobile factors of
production

1112.

Our model is a complete, two-country dynamic general equilibrium model
which determines (among other things) both the levels and the growth rates of

output and output per worker in each country.

For reasons of space and

because (with the help of one further assumption) it permits a major reduction
in the amount of tedious algebra inflicted on the reader, we restrict
ourselves to the analysis of the determinants of productivity growth differentials
between the two countries.

This is an important subject in its ·own right.

Can.Japanese-level productivity be imported "off-the-shelf"?

The prediction that, with a common global technology and free
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international mobility of financial capital, levels and growth rates of output
per worker should be equalized across the globe is a source of empirical
embarrassment.

This remains true even if its sharp edges are dulled somewhat

by allowing for real world restrictions on the international mobility of
financial capital and for adjustment costs in the accumulation of augmentable
factors of production.
It makes no sense to have as one's maintained hypothesis the notion that
Bolivia or Togo can order to go, off-the~shelf and.overnight (or subject to a
few years delay to allow for the presence of the familiar strictly convex
adjustment costs of the neoclassical theory of investment), the highest
productivity levels of the last decade of the twentieth century, simply by
opening themselves completely to international financial capital mobility and
international transfer of technology.

There are important "local" or national

essential complementary inputs into the production process that cannot be
imported but have to be "home-grown".

We are referring to the social,

political, cultura1-, legal and educational infrastructure without which modes
of production and economic organization conducive to high productivity cannot
be realized.
In our formal model, we try to capture some of the essence of these
"home-grown" inputs by including in the production function a non-traded
capital good ("human capital") whose production requires a non-traded current
input (efficiency units of labor time) that has an alternative use 1n
consumption as intrinsically valued leisure.

The model can easily be extended

to include a second alternative use for labor time, by allowing current labor
time to be used in the production of goods other than human capital.

This

second good, which can be consumed privately or publicly or used for physical
capital accumulation, would be the traded output of our current model.

r-
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The notion that the current endowment of labor time can be used either
for accumulating human capital or for the production of marketable output is a
standard feature of many endogenous growth models (see e.g. Lucas [1988] and
Romer [199Oa]).

For expository simplicity only, we exclude "raw" labor (in

our formal model the time endowment of the young generation) from use as an
input in the current production of the traded good.

Only physical (traded)

capital and human (non-traded) capital (in our formal model the endowment of
time (in efficiency units) of the middle-aged) are arguments in the production
function of traded output13.
Ve realize that our non-traded human capital good whose production
requires the input of a non-traded, non-produced input that has alternative
uses as a consumption good (or as both a consumption good and a productive
input into the production of traded goods), captures but very partially our
notion of "home-grown" infrastructure.

Some elements of the home-grown

infrastructure (the rule of law, the clear definition and defense of property
rights, the enforcement of contracts and general popular attitudes towards
entrepreneurship, business and private profit) are variables with a bounded
range of variation rather than resembling capital-like inputs whose quantity
can be varied (given time and effort) without upper bound.
Other "home-grown" inputs such as a skilled and educated labor force fit
more easily into our formal straight jacket.

It is true that countries can

send their citizens abroad to advance their education and that the processes
of education and training within a country can make use of imported inputs.
This, however is, and has been historically, of second-order importance.

In

our formal model human capital cannot be traded at all, but in one version of
the model we permit the production of human capital goods to make use of a
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traded input in addition to non-traded domestic labor time.

There is,

however, imperfect substitutability between the home-grown and the tradable
inputs to human capital accumulation.

Our formal model should, however, be

viewed only as a first stab at characterizing "difficult" and uneven economic

growth and development.

~e believe that, when attempting to map.from our

formal model to the real world, the non-tradedness of human capital and labor
services should be interpreted as due to more basic factors (technological,
economic, social, political and cultural) than just restrictive trade
policies.

Models that imply that, but for perverse government policies,

Japanese levels of productivity could be achieved everywhere within a
relatively short period of time cannot, in our view, be taken seriously.

Increasing returns.
It is extremely simple, analytically, to account for persistent (and even
widening) differentials in national or regional productivity levels and/or
growth rates by working with models that exhibit increasing returns to mobile
factors of production at the level of the national or regional economy.

Both

the command optimum and the competitive equilibrium (if one exists 14) of many
models with increasing returns to scale will, ~ith international or
interregional-mobility of non-labor factors of production and immobile labor,
lead to widening differentials between national levels or growth rates of
labor productivity.

Accumulation and production will often tend to become

concentrated in the nation or region that started off, through historical
accident, with the largest scale of production.
Even in models without persistent endogenous or exogenous growth,
increasing returns to scale and factor mobility may lead to regional
(including national) divergence in production patterns (see e.g. the

7

"economies of agglomeration" studied by Arthur [1983, 1988 and 1989] and
Krugman [1990]).

In the current paper we assume constant returns to scale and competitive
output markets, although we intend to investigate in future work the
consequences of (bounded and unbounded) increasing returns and of
non-competitive behavior by firms.
How important are increasing returns to scale?

Views on the empirical

significance of increasing returns (and other sources of non-convexities in
the production possibility set) seem to move in irregular cycles (see e.g
Smith [1775, especially the famous Volume 1, Chapter 3], Young [1928],
Arrow [1962], Kaldor [1966, 1975, 1981] for a range of early formal or
informal arguments in support of the proposition that increasing returns
matter for the explanation of aggregate economic growth).
The issue can of course only be settled empirically.

There is no

evidence we know of that convincingly supports the existence of unbounded
increasing returns to scale

1s16. ·

Testing empirically for the presence or absence of increasing returns to
scale is complicated by the absence of any clear consensus on what the
relevant scale variable is, that is on where the increasing returns are
located.

Some theories seem to locate increasing returns at the level of the

individual enterprise, establishment or plant.

Others suggest industry

output, often without specifying whether it is the regional, national or
global industry that matters.

Current output and cumulative output have both

been suggested as scale variables.

In Lucas [1988], the aggregate (national?)

stock of human capital generates the key externality.

While externalities and

increasing returns are in principle quite distinct, in Lucas [1988] the human
capital externalities do create increasing returns, in the sense that
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activities which absent the externality would have constant returns to scale,
experience increasing returns with the externality.

A very different picture

emerges if it is not the total but the average level of human capital that
generates the externality.

The stock or flow of R&D (or of "knowledge") is

often assumed to generate externalities and increasing returns to scale in
activities that, absent the externality would have constant returns to scale.
l&ether this occurs at the level of the industry (national, regional or
global) or of the global economy as a whole is left open by the theory.
A recent statement of the view that nonconvexities matter greatly both at
the level of the individual firm and at the aggregate level is in Paul Romer
[1990b].

Romer's views on these issues carry weight because of his central

role in launching the "endogenous growth" research program (see especially
Romer [1986, 1987]; for further developments see Lucas [1988],
Romer [1989a,b; 1990a], Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny [1989]).

It is therefore

important to point out that the arguments in Romer [1990b] leading

to

his

linking of non-rivalness and increasing returns are based partly on an a-priori

assertion or postulate, partly on a non-sequitur and partly on interesting and
suggestive illustrations, but not on systematic empirical investigation.
The a-priori assertion, which we shall refer to as the "replication
postulate"; comes 1n the form of the following bold statement:
"The most basic premise in our scientific reasoning about the
physical world is that it (is) possible to replicate any sequence of
events by replicating the relevant initial conditions. (This is
both a statement of faith and a definition of relevant initial
conditions)." (Romer [1990b, p. 3]).
Internally consistent Postulates are neither right nor "'rang.

If they

are to be useful to an empirical science, the primitive terms they contain
must be interpretable unambiguously in terms of real world counterparts.
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(This must be where faith comes in).

The replication postulate, however, is

not supplemented with any hints as to what "relevant initial conditions" might
mean in any empirical scientific application.

Until a rule is provided for

determining and verifying "relevant initial conditions", the replication
postulate is without empirical content, an empty box.i7
Romer goes on to fill the empty box with the following assertion:
"For production theory, this means that it is possible to double the
output of any production process by doubling all of the rival inputs"
(Romer [1990b, p. 3]).
This, of course, is a non-sequitur unless we accept the empirical statement
that the relevant initial conditions are limited to the rival inputs 18 •

No

arguments are given to support this claim.
If instead one were to make the (no less plausible) assertion that the
relevant initial conditions consist of the rival inputs and the nonrival
inputs, there would be constant returns to rival and non-rival inputs
combined.
One could go further and quite plausibly take the rival inputs (or both
the rival and nonrival inputs combined) together with the moment of their
application to constitute the relevant initial conditions.

In that case there

cannot be constant returns to rival inputs (or to both rival and nonrival
inputs combined) if the replication of the rival inputs (or of both the rival
and nonrival inputs) takes place at a different date from their initial or
benchmark application: we pass this way but once.
By far the simplest way of underlining the vacuousness of the replication
postulate, however, is by permitting scale (of production or of application of
inputs) to belong to the set of relevant initial conditions.

Assume for
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concreteness that the list of rival and non-rival inputs completes the set of
relevant initial conditions.
settings, A and B.

Consider two carefully controlled experimental

Replication in experimental setting B of the productive

process in experimental setting A involves applying the same quantities of all
(rival and non-rival) inputs in the two experimental Settings.

Application of

the replication postulate implies that the same levels of output will be
produced in both A and B.
Doubling the quantity of all inputs applied in A (doubling the scale of
production) and doubling the quantity of all inputs applied in B again results
(given the replication postulate and our list of relevant initial conditions)
in equal levels of output in the two experimental settings.

Nothing is

implied, however, about increasing, constant or decreasing returns to scale
"within" the two settings.

The output levels in A and B following the

doubling of the input levels of all rival and non-rival inputs may have
doubled, quadrupled, fallen by half or remained constant.
Like Romer's application of the replication postulate to production
theory, our last four paragraphs do not contain any serious reference to the
only kind of evidence that could resolve the returns to scale issue: empirical
evidence from the physical and bio-rnedical sciences, from production
engineering, from management science and even from the social sciences on
indivisibilities and other possible sources of fixed costs.
Non-rival inputs clearly exist (Starrett's example of information as a
productive input is an obvious one (Starrett [1988, p. 74])) and may well be
important empirically, although no systematic evidence has as yet been
collected.

Their existence and significance is a totally separate issue from

. the existence and significance of increasing returns to scale.
· ~e conclude this introduction with a brief outline of the rest of the
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paper.

Section 2 develops the model.

Section 3 analyzes a very simple

special case in which human capital accumulation requires no traded inputs.
Traded inputs into human capital accumulation are added in. Section 4, which
considers the effects of changes in distortionary tax rates and exhaustive
public spending.

Section 5 studies the effects of deficit financing and

lump-sum intergenerational redistribution on growth rate differentials.·.
Section 6 concludes.
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(2) THE

IODEL.

a. Household behavior.

The decisions concerning consumption, labor supply, human capital
formation and financial portfolio allocation are taken by
households-consumers.

The household sector in each country is modeled through

a three period overlapping generations model.
decision rules for the home country.

Ve only derive the household

The corresponding decision rules for the

foreign households are obtained attaching the superscript * to foreign taste
parameters and household choice variables. In the first period of its life
. per10
. d t has an en dowment of time,
.
( ' yout h' ) , t he J. th consumer born 1n
j hot
when measured in-efficiency uni ts, which she can either choose to c-onsume as
leisure

r\

in period t or to allocate to an alternative use, which we shall

call education

jet

This education process during the first period of

household's life adds to the endowment of labor time in efficiency units
during the second period ('middle age'), that is during period t+l for a
household born in period t.

Vhile young the household can also choose to spend private resources
other than time on human capital formation.
education

Such private spending on

will have to be financed by borrowing, since the household is

born without financial endowment and does not earn any income in the first
period of its life.
also boosts

1
jht.

Public spending on the education of household j,

jgt

For simplicity the young are assumed not to pay any taxes

or to receive any transfer payments other than the benefits from the "transfer
in kind" jgt' which cannot be resold by the recipient.
There is a key externality in the process of human capital formation.
0
Formally we model this by assuming that jht,
the amount of time measured in
efficiency units (henceforth human capital) that the j th household of
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generation t starts off with is given by the average amount of human capital
achieved by the previous generation during middle age, that is, letting Nt
denote the number of households-consumers in period t,
0

1

J.ht = Nt-l

Nt-1

~
i=l

1

iht-1

Each member of a new generations stands, as regards its starting level of
human capital (knowledge, education), on the shoulders of the average member
of the previous generation.

Note that }!-l is non-rival with respect to the

levels of human capital achieved in period t by members of generation t ,
ih~, i

=

1, ... , Nt.

If generation tis larger (say because of a higher rate

of population growth), more members of generation twill benefit from the
We

higher (average) level of education achieved by the previous generation.
1

0

·
also assume that the effect of jht-l on iht

is non-excludable.

Those rn

generation t who benefit from the knowledge accumulated by generation t-1
cannot be made to pay for these benefits.

Such complete non-excludability will

almost surely result in Pareto-inefficiency of the unaided competitive
equilibrium.

This human capital accumulation mechanism is an obvious

extension of the one developed by Lucas [1988], following Uzawa [1965].

Apart

from our use of an OLG structure instead of Lucas' representative
infinite-lived agent, our human capital accumulation technology differs by
permitting the use of purchased produced inputs in addition to time.
Note that if the OLG structure without voluntary private
intergenerational transfers were to be replaced by one which permitted an
operative intergenerational gift and bequest motive, part of the
intergenerational externality would be internalized.

If private

intergenerational transfers were motivated by concern about the welfare of
ancestors or descendants (rather than by the joy of giving), each generation
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would allow for and value appropriately the positive effect of its own
education expenditures (jet and jmt for household j of generation t) on the
human capital of its children, grandchildren and subsequent descendants.

The

1
beneficial effects of jht-l
are however, in our specification, not limited to

the lineal descendants of household j but are shared by all born in period t
and later.

Unless, through vigorous intermarriage a la Bernheim and

Bagwell [1988], all of society effectively constitutes one big happy family,
the human capital formation externality, whose domain is both
intergenerational and across families or dynasties, will not be fully
internalized ~ven if one assumed universal operative intergenerational gift
motives.

During the second period (middle age) the only household choice
1 The entire
concerns how much to consume, jct.
endowment of labor time
services in efficiency units jhi is supplied inelastically in the labor

market.
In the last period of life ('old age' or 'retirement') households do not
work or educate themselves.

The old consume jc~ , which equals the value of

the resources they carried into old age through saving in the first two period
of their lives, minus any taxes jr~ paid in their last period.
Formally, each household j, (j

=

1, ... ,Nt) of generation t, (t > 0)

maximizes the following:
(1)

2
2
1 Max
1
2 .ut = P u(.ct)
{jft, jht' jet, jmt' jct, jct} J
J

+

1

Pu(.ct)
J

+

v(.ft)
J

u(.) and v(.) are increasing, strictly quasi-concave, twice continuously

differentiable and satisfy the Inada conditions
lim u(x)

x~ro

= lim v(x) = 1/lim u(x) = 1/lim
x~ro
x~o
x~o

subject to

v(x)

=

O; P > 0.
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1

(2)

1

1

- Ot+l - ~t+l)jmt + jhtwt+1 - jct - j 7 t

- [jc~ + jr~](l + rt+2 - Ot+2)-1 > 0
(3)

(4)
(5)

19

0

jit = jht - jet
Nt-1
ih!-1
jh~ = N~-1 i~l
.et .mt .gt
0
1
jht = jht [1 + ¢(4,4,S---)J
J.ht J-ht J.ht
.
At the initial date, t

=

O, we have jh~ > 0.

In equation (1), Pis the constant one-period subjective discount factor.
It need not be less than unity.
Equation 2 is the lifetime budget constraint of member j of generation t.
wt+l the wage paid per unit of efficiency labor in period t+l.
interest factor on loans from period t to period t+1 is

The before tax

1 + rt+l·

Otis the

period t residence-based tax rate on all non-human asset income 1n the home
country.

It is therefore also the subsidy rate to all domestic borrowing,

including borrowing by the young.

We also wish to consider the subsidization

of "student loans" (expenditures on human ca.pita.I formation) a.s a. policy
instrument.

~

is the subsidy rate on these loans.

Households.. also pay

lump-sum taxes when middle aged (jri) and when old (jr~)be negative.

These can of course

We assume that the authorities do not tax any generation "into

the ground", that is jr! and jr~ are such that (2) can be satisfied for
1

2

positive values of jct, jct and jmt.

¢(.,.,.), the (proportional) return function for the household's human
capital formation process, is increasing in its three arguments, strictly
concave, twice continuously differentiable and satisfies
¢(0,.,.) = 0

16

This means that current education jet is essential for a positive rate of
growth of human capital.
(6)

Nt = (1 + n)Nt-l

Population grows at a constant proportional rate:
n > -1; N0 > 0.

Ve also have:

Since jgt > O, our specification of the human capital investment function
implies that per Gapita human capital never declines.

It would be easy to

allow for human capital depreciation, "forgetting", and other snags in the
intergenerational transmission of knowledge, without this affecting the key
qualitative properties of our model.
Household j of generation 2 behaves competitively (takes "'t+l' rt+l and
rt+ 2 as given) and also takes jh~ , jr!, jr~, 0t' ~t and jgt as given.

We

assume that each household from a given generation within a country are
identical.

Ve can therefore drop the j subscript and write the solution to

the household optimization problem as follows:
1
2
(7)
-u-' (' ct ) -- ~'1 + 1- t+2 - Ot+2J'(J U , ( Ct)'
'
(8)

(9)
(10)

{11)
(12)

(13)
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To gain the advantage of closed-form solutions we shall consider the
special case where the single-period utility is of the constant elasticity of
marginal utility form, that is
u(x)

(14a)

= v(x) = 1: 1 x1- 1 ;

; ~ 0.

In addition we'll assume that the human capital growth rate function¢
takes the constant returns Cobb-Douglas form given in (14b)
· )1-a
a(
et mt+ gt
et mt gt
o ~a~ 1; n >
(14b)
¢(a, :o, :o) = n--◊--ht
ht ht ht

o

We have chosen the special case where the public sector inputs into the
education process, g,
inputs, m.

are perfect substitutes for the private sector traded

It would be easy to extend the analysis to the case where they are

imperfect substitutes or where the private traded input is strictly more or
less productive in the education process than the public input20.

Note from

our specification of the private budget constraint (10) that public
th individual can only be enjoyed by
expenditure on education benefiting the i
the i th individual: it is excludable and rival. It cannot be resold. This of
course will matter only if them~ 0 constraint is binding.
The household decision rules for the foreign country are completely
analogous to those for the home country given in equations (7) to (13) and
will not be reproduced here.

Parameters, variables and functions with the

superscript * will characterize the foreign country.

Note that while all

taste and policy parameters can differ between the two countries, the
production function (introduced below) and the human capital accumulation
technology, represented by the¢ function are the same in both countries.

b. Firm behavior.

Firms are competitive and maximize profits.

Both factors of production
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(labor and capital) can be varied costlessly at parametric factor prices.
Output, iy is sold in a competitive world market.

For the moment we assume

that the production function is linear homogeneous in the two factors of
production that can be varied at the discretion of the firm.

In the home

country, firm i, i = 1, ... ,1 faces the production function
iYt = F(ikt' iht)

(lS)

This function is linear homogeneous in the i th firm's two private inputs,
capital ikt and efficiency units of labor iht' with F(O,.) = F(.,O) = O,
increasing in both its arguments, strictly concave, twice continuously
differentiable and satisfies the Inada conditions: lim ~ = 1/lim ~ =
.k~o i
.k~ro i
1
1
.
oF
11m
7J1i

.h~o
1

i

BF = ro . Capital depreciation is ignored.
= l/l.1m 7J1i

.h~ro

1

i

The linear homogeneity of the production function permits us to write:
.yt/.ht
l

l"

= F(.kt/.ht,
1) = f(.kt/.ht)
1
1
1
1

The first-order conditions for optimal use of capital and labor are:
rt = f, (/t/ iht)
wt= f(ikt/iht) - (ikt/iht)f'(ikt/iht)
We assume all firms in the domestic economy to be identical.

Dropping

the subscript i we write the aggregate production function for the home
country and the representative domestic firm's first order conditions as
follows:
(16)

Yt = F(Kt' Ht)= Htf(Kt/Ht)

(17)

rt= f'(Kt/Ht)

(18)

wt= f(Kt/Ht)

(Kt/Ht)f•(Kt/Ht) = M(Kt/Ht)'
M' =

-(Kt/Ht)f••(Kt/Ht) > 0.

The derivation of foreign country output, interest rate and wage rate is
analogous.

Note that the two countries have identical production technologies
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f(.)

We also assume that at the initial date, t = O, K0

+

*
K0 > 0.

(c) The government.

In both countries the government spends on the education of its young,
levies lump-sum taxes on the middle aged and the old, taxes all asset income
of its residents, pays interest on its debt and borrows to finance any excess
of current outlays over current revenues.
debt denominated in the traded output.
government debt outstanding is Bt.

Government debt is single-period

The outstanding stock of home country
*

Foreign government debt is denoted Bt.

The home country government budget identities is given in equation (19).
conventional solvency constraints, given in (20) is assumed to apply.

The

The

foreign country counterparts are obvious and have been omitted.
(19)

(20)

*
B0 and B0 are given.

(d) larket equilibrium.

There is perfect international mobility of financial capital.

In the

absence of distortionary source-based taxes on capital income, the domestic
and foreign before-tax interest rates and rates of return on fixed capital
will be equalized.
(21)
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The after-tax rates of return to private saving, 1 + rt - Ot in the home
country and 1 + rt - Ot* in the foreign country, however, can differ.

These

policy-induced distortions are quite separate from the distortions due to the
externalities in human capital formation.
From the production function, equalization of capital-human capital
ratios in the two economies implies that the wage rates (of efficiency labor)
in the two countries are also equalized, although labor itself is not traded
internationally.
(22)

The fact that both countries' labor markets clear each period means that
(23a)
(23b)

1

Ht= ht-lNt-1

*

*1 *

Ht= ht-lNt-1
The condition for equilibrium rn the world capital market is given in

equation (24), where equalization of domestic and foreign interest rates and
wage rates has already been imposed.

(l + rt - Ot - ~t)mt-l]Nt-1 - mtNt

*

* *

*

**

- (l + rt - Ot - ~t)mt-l]Nt-1 - mtNt

The total stock of non-human assets at the end of period t (the beginning

* has to be willingly held by the
* + Bt+l + Bt+l
of period t+l) Kt+l + Kt+l
private sectors of the two countries.

The old (those born in period t-2) will

not be holding any assets: they have at the end of period t just exhausted the
last of their lifetime savings.

The savings of the middle aged (those born in

period t-1) will be the sum of their piimary (non-interest) current surpluses
during middle age ([wth!_1 - c!_1 - 7!_1] per person of generation t-1 in the
case of the home country) and their compounded primary current surpluses from
their youth (- (1 + rt - Ot - ~t)mt-l per person of generation t-1 rn the case
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of the home country).

The young at the end of period t (those born in period

t) will have negative savings equal to the value of their borrowing to finance
their education (student loans).

In ·the case of the home country this amounts

to savings of -mt per person of generation t.

Home country private financial

wealth at the beginning of period t+l, St+l is given by (25).

Zt+l denotes

the net foreign assets of the home country at the beginning of period t+l.
*

Note that Z = - Z .
_
1
1
(25 ) 8t+l = [wtht-1 - ct-1 -

7

1
t-1 - (l + rt - Ot - Wt)mt-l]Nt-1 - mtNt

Equation (24) can be obtained from the global goods market equilibrium
condition in (26), the two private sector life-time budget constraints (10 in
the case of the home country), the two public sector budget identities (19)
for the home country and (20), the "exhaustion of output by factor payments"
conditions (27a) and (27b) and the condition given in (28) that what the old
in period t spend on consumption and taxes must be equal to the principal plus
(net of tax) interest they carried forward from the previous period.
*
*
*
(26) yt + yt = Kt+l - Kt+ Kt+l - Kt
* * *1 *
*2 *
1
2
+ mtNt +Ct-lNt-1 + ct-2Nt-2 + mtNt +ct-lNt-1 + C.t-2 Nt-2
(27a)
(27b)
(28)
+ rt - ot
*
*
* *
Kt+ Kt + 8t + 8t + mt-lNt-1 + mt-lNt-1
. *
Defining the notation: k = K/H; k* = K*/H * ; b = B/H and b _ B*/H * ,
equation (24) can be rewritten as:
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*1 *
*t
0
h_t_N__[1 + n] b*
hi NO 1 + n
t+1
=

To achieve an equilibrium for this 2-country economy that is Pareto
efficient, the two governments are required to. subsidize human capital
formation in order to internalize the externality, to forswear the use of
distortionary taxes and possibly to choose their human capital accumulation
inputs g and g* to achieve productive efficiency.

In addition one of the

governments may have to use lump-sum taxes and transfers to ensure dynamic
efficiency

21.

The first-best policy to internalize the externali ty is to

subsidize time spent by the young in education, et.

In our model such an

education subsidy is equivalent either to a subsidy on the wage earned by the
middle aged or to a tax on leisure.
If in our model we also permitted the young to work (in addition to
choosing between leisure and education), and if work did not produce a human
capital externality, then the equivalence between a subsidy to education, a
tax on leisure and a wage subsidy to the middle-aged would break down.
Efficiency would then require a subsidy to education or a tax both on leisure
and on time spent working while young.

The equivalence between an education

subsidy and a tax on leisure would also breaks down when the middle-aged can
choose leisure, unless age discrimination can be built into the leisure tax.
A subsidy to borrowing by the young for educational expenditures is not needed
in the first best.

If a tax on leisure or a wage subsidy are not feasible,

then subsidizing student loans will be a second-best policy.

Subsidizing
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private borrowing in general will be next best.

(e) International productivity differentials.
1
= Htf(kt) = ht_
1Nt_1f(kt). Output per worker Il in the home

Note that Yt

country is given by
Tit= Yt/Nt-1

=

h!_1f(kt)

The rate of growth of output per worker,
0t+1
,rt

=~ t

1r

is given by

1

Similarly, with a common technology and free capital mobility, we have for the
foreign country:
*
* *
*1
Ilt = Yt/Nt-1 = ht-1f(kt)
TI

'/f t* --

*

= ¥-1
nt

It follows that the differences in the growth rate of output per worker are
due solely to (and are (almost) equal to) differences in the growth rate of
human capital per worker22:
*1
1
ht f(kt+1)
*
ht
(30)
'/ft - '/ft = [-1- - -ri- h(k)
t
ht-1 ht-1
Indeed, in steady state, the labor productivity growth differential is
given by:
{31)

'/f -

'Ir

*

(f) Investment shares and growth rate differentials.

Our model has some strong implications concerning growth rate
differentials and investment share differences.

The causation, however, runs

24

from the exogenous or policy-determined growth differentials to the endogenous
investment shares.

In our model the home-country investment share is given by

Considering only steady states for simplicity, we have that

The excess of the home country steady-state share of fixed capital
formation in growth rate GDP over the foreign share is therefore given by
K,-K,

*

= [(1 + 1r)(1 + n) - (1 +

,r

*)(1

+

k
n*)]f(l<T

The exogenous growth differential therefore drives the endogenous investment
share difference23.

(g) The global equilibrium.

As the focus of this paper is on productivity growth rate differentials
rather than on the levels in the individual countries, it will turn out to be
possible, under conditions to be stated below, to ignore the evolution (and
endogenous response) of such global variables as the capital-human capital
ratio k and the two public debt-human capital ratios band b* . A few words
about one feature of the long-run or steady-state equilibrium are however in
order.
*

1

1

*1

*1

Consider the case where the fiscal variables 0, 0, rt/ht and rt /ht,
1

*

*1

gt/ht, gt/ht

are constants and the two national public debt-human capital
*

*

ratios are also constants, that is bt = b for all t and bt = b for all t.
Lump-sum taxes on the old r~/hi and r; 2/h; 1 adjust so as to satisfy the public
sector budget identities.
There are two different kinds of steady state solutions.

In the first,

the long run growth rate of aggregate human capital differs between the two
countries.

In the second they are the same.
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Consider first the case of differential long-run growth rates of the
aggregate national human capital stocks.

Yithout loss of generality we

consider the case where the relative weight of the foreign country in the
*1 *
* t
global capital market -ht1-No[l+n]
- - - = ut decreases steadily, that is the growth
ht N0 1+n
rate of aggregate human capital in the home country is higher than in the
foreign country.

Note that this does not necessarily require that home
country per capita human capital ht1 grows at a faster rate than ht*1 ;

population growth rates matter as much as the growth rates of per capita human
capital.

Yhich country dominates the capital markets in the long run depends

on relative size (measured by population in efficiency units) alone.
From (29) we notice that the long run or steady-state global
capital-human capital ratio k is governed by the parameters describing private
sector and government behavior in the home country alone according to
2

2

c + r
m
1
h (1 + n)(1 + f'(k) - 0) The second case is where there exists a steady state value of relative
k

+

b =

T

foreign country size ut that is neither zero nor infinite but some positive
constant value

u 24 •

In this case the appropriate steady-state condition for

global capital market equilibrium will continue to reflect the parameters
characterizing private sector and government behavior in both countrjes
according to their relative weight, as shown in the following equation:
2
2
*
m
(1 + u)k + b + ub = C1 + r
h tl +*2n)(l *2+ f'(k) - 0)
+ r
+ U C
1
h (1 + n )(1 + f'(k) - 0) - ::l]

-7
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(3) A SIIPLE EXAMPLE.

Consider the following special case where the single-period utility
functions in both countries are logarithmic (r = 1), the growth rates of human
*

capital depend only on education (a= 1) and gt= gt= 0.

From

a=

1 it

*
follows immediately that mt= mt=
0.

It is well-known that in OLG models such as ours, absent distortionary
taxes, debt financing of public expenditure matters for the real equilibrium
only to the extent that it redistributes lifetime resources between
generations.

For instance, issuing public debt when debt service is financed

with taxes on the middle-aged, is equivalent to balanced-budget
intergenerational redistribution from the middle-aged to the old, that is, it
is equivalent to an increase in the scale of an unfunded social security
retirement scheme.

As long as there are no distortionary taxes, we could

therefore restrict the analysis of taxes, transfers and public debt to
balanced budget redistribution between the middle-aged and the old.
Clearly, when there are distortionary taxes such as our asset income
taxes, the ability to alter the time profile of distortionary tax rates by
unbalancing the budget will have real consequences.
The home country household equilibrium for this special case is given by
2

(32)

ct

1 = (l + rt+2 - 0t+2)P
ct

1

(33)

ct
lt

(34)

lt = ht - et

(35)

h! = h~ + 11et = (1 + 11)h~ - 11lt

= Pwt+11/
0
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2

2

1
1
1
ct - rt
htwt+l - ct - rt . . ., --,-----....--=O
l + rt+2 - 0t+2

(36)

In addition we have the equation for the home country intergenerational
transmission of human capital (37) and the home country government budget
identity (38):
(37)

Obvious counterparts to each of the last seven equations exist for the
foreign country.

The world-wide capital market equilibrium condition is
*

equation (29) with mt= mt= 0 for all t.
2
We obtain the following solution for ct:
2

2 fJ (l + rt+2 (39) ct=
2
1 + fJ + fJ
2

.
ct
Smee it= 2
, it follows that the growth of human
fJ (1 + rt+2 - O)wt+l
.
capital in the home country is governed by equation (40), with a parallel
equation for the foreign country:

(40) hl =
t

{J(l + {J)(l + q) hl
[1 + {J + {32]
t-1
2

rt
+ (1 + {J + {J2)w(kt+l) [rt+ -1.,--+_f.,....,-,{...-kt_+_2....-)--__,,0t_+_2-]
1

1

From equation (40) it is clear that, at a given value of k, the rate of
growth of human capital per capita between period t and period t+l depends on
three factors.

Two of these can differ between the countries.

They are the

• rate of time preference (1 - {J)/{J and the present discounted value of the net
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lifetime transfer of resources away from members of generation t through the
2

rt
government budget rt+ 1 +
rt+2 - 8t+2
1

The third is part of the technology, assumed to be common to both countries.
It is the productivity or efficiency of the human capital accumulation
process, measured by n-

At a given value of the ratio of non-human to human capital k, a lower
time preference rate, that is a larger subjective discount factor P means a
.relatively.higher valuation of future vs. current consumption.

It implies a

higher rate of accumulation of human capital by the young (as well as an
increased desire for financial saving by the middle-aged).
Similarly, at a given value of k, a net increase in lifetime resources of
a generation increases consumption of all normal goods.
good.

Leisure is a normal

Education or human capital formation will decline as a result.

Anything that reduces the present discounted value of the lifetime taxes paid
by a generation will reduce human capital formation by that generation.

For

instance, the anticipated (in period t) substitution of borrowing for taxes on
the middle-aged in period t+l (a reduction in r1) or for taxes on the old 1n
period t+2 (a reduction in r~) will reduce the human capital accumulation
effort of the generation born in period t and thus the period t growth rate of
human capital.

An increase inn will stimulate human capital accumulation at a given
value of k, even though it will, through the effect it has on the demand for
leisure, reduce the time spent on education in natural units.

Education

measured in efficiency units increases.
Using equations (30), (40) and the foreign counterpart of (40), the
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difference between the national growth rates of output per worker can be
written as:

(41J

't - .; =

[c1

+

T}){ /3(1 + /3) 2
[1 + /3 + /3 ]

It is clear from (41) that, given zero net lifetime expected fiscal
2 1

7
1 1 .
tfht-1
transfers to generation t in both countries (rt/ht-l + 1--,,-..,.......-....----..---=
+ f'(kt+2) - 0t+2
*2 *1
7
*1 *1
t /ht-1
rt /ht-l + 1 + f'(k
)- O* = 0), the more patient country will have the
t+2
t+2
*
*
higher productivity growth rate in period t: /3 >_/3 implies rt> rt. Also, if

/3

=

*
/3,
then the country that is expected to make the larger life time fiscal

transfer to generation twill have the lower growth rate of productivity in
period t.
Also from (41), a set of sufficient conditions for being able to perform
productivity growth differential comparative dynamics while ignoring the
effects of exogenous shocks on k, band b* is that only steady states are
considered (kt+l = kt) and that the initial values of the four lump-sum tax
1
2
*1
*2
parameters are zero (rt = rt = rt = rt = 0) 2s.
Another set of sufficient conditions for being able to analyze the effect
on the productivity growth differential of parameter and policy changes,
without consideration of the effect of such changes on the economy-wide state
*

variables k, b and b , is also immediately apparent from (41). . It is that all
shocks are evaluated at an initial symmetric equilibrium; this means that in
the initial equilibrium all private sector behavioral parameters and policy
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* Ot = Ot;
* rt/ht-l
1 1
instrument values are identical in the two countries: P = P;
*1 *1
*2 *1
2 1
= rt /ht-1; rt/ht-1 = rt /ht-l. \le shall ref er to this as the symmetric case.
Note that in neither of these cases do distortionary asset income tax
rates affect the growth rate differential.

In the general case, they can,

from equation (41), affect the differential by altering the present discounted
value. of life time lump-sum transfers to members of generation t (for a given
value of kt+l) and by altering kt+l'

\'hen, as in the next Section, the young

borrow to finance the use of produced inputs in the accumulation of human
capital (0 <a< 1), there is another channel through which distortionary
taxes influence the rate of growth differential: the after-tax interest rate
(which is a function of 0,

'{J

,0* and '{J * even at a given value of k) influences

the demand by the young for the produced human capital accumulation input.
Under either of these two sets of sufficient conditions, the effects of
private parameter changes or policy changes on home country productivity
growth at a given value of k are the same as the effects on the productivity
growth differential discussed earlier in this Section.

(4) TRADED PRIVATE AND PUBLIC INPUTS IN HUMAN CAPITAL ACCUMULATION.

\'hen we consider the general constant elasticity of marginal utility
single-period utility function (1 ! 0) and traded inputs are permitted as an
argument in the function for the growth rate of human capital (0 $a$ 1),
equations (32) and (33) become
(32')

(33')

31

Privately optimal choice of mt may involve (for sufficiently large gt) a
corner solution at mt= 0.

For the case where the constraint mt> 0 is not

binding, we have the additional first order condition:
(42)

1 + rt+l - Ot+l - ~t+l = wt+l~(l - a)e~ (mt+ gt)-a

Finally, the human capital accumulation function is now
1 ht+
0
(35')
ht=
~eta( mt+ gt )1-a
For positive values of a, the growth of human capital in the home country
is now governed by:

(43)

+

>0

The interpretation of this is clearer when we write down the solutions
for the two inputs in the human capital accumulation process
1
2
(44 ) et= fl3[hi-1(n2nI - wt+l) + r! + 1:;t+2-0t+2 - (l+rt+1- 0t+1-~t+l)gt]
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Equation (45) holds of course only when the constraint mt~ 0 is not binding.
For the foreign country, equations analogous to (43), (44) and (45) can
be derived.

Noting that a, ~,wand rare the same in the two countries, the

*
foreign equations are obtained by attaching the superscript to each,, P, g,
71 , 72 , 0 and~ in equations (43) to (45). We again are considering only the

effect of variations in the parameters describing private sector behavior and
fiscal policy on productivity growth differentials.

For simplicity we also focus

on perturbations of an initial symmetric equilibrium, which now amounts to the
*

restriction that in the initial equilibrium we have P = P;
1
*2 *1
2 1
*1 *1
* 1 1
~t = ~t; 7t/ht-1 = 7t /ht-1; 7t/ht-1 = 7t /ht-1 and gt/ht-1
technologies are, as always, constrained to be identical.

In this Section the

net lifetime fiscal transfer to generation tis assumed to be equal to zero,
7

2

t
that is 7t + l+rt+2-0t+2 - (l+rt+l-Ot+l-~t+l)gt
*2
7
*
*
*
t
*1
= 7t + - - - ~ (l+rt+l-Ot+l-~t+l)gt = O
l+rt+2-0t+2
1
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It is easily checked that under these conditions an increase in the value
of f3 raises the growth rate of per capita human capital in the home country
relative to the growth rate of per capita human capital in the foreign
country.

This result is independent of the value of 7.

Greater home country

patience achieves this relatively higher rate of growth of productivity by
raising both et and mt relative to the foreign country.
Note that with borrowing by the young to finance the purchase of traded
inputs into the human capital accumulation process, the effect of a lower rate
of time preference (a higher value of /3) on home country relative private
financial wealth is ambiguous.
debt.

This is true even if there is no government

'While a higher value of /3 will cause the middle-aged to save more, it

will also cause the young to dissave more by taking out more "student loans"
(see equation (25)).

Since the increased value of the human capital assets

acquired by the young is not counted in conventionally measured saving, the
net effect of an increase in /3 on conventionally measured private financial
wealth is ambiguous.
The analysis of the effects of a change in
loans, is straightforward.

t.p,

the subsidy rate on student

Consider the case where the value of gt equals

zero 26 • The reduction in cost of borrowing by the young increases mt.

The

effect on time spent on education, et, is ambiguous, since, if the initial
value of mt is positive, the increase in the subsidy rate will have a positive
income effect which cet. par. would increase the demand for leisure.

Since

consumption during middle age and during old age are both normal goods,
however, the effect on the total amount of resources transferred from youth to
middle age is positive.

The relative growth rate of productivity in period t

therefore increases in the home country.
The effect of an increase in O on relative home country prorlucti vi ty
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growth (in a symmetric equilibrium) is the same as that of an increase in~ if
in addition 7t2 = 0.

There is of course a further impact on global savings

through the effect of an increase in Oon the intertemporal terms of trade of
the middle-aged.
As long as the non-negativity constraint on private spending on education
(mt~ 0) is not binding and (43), (44) and (45) hold, an increase in public
spending on education (gt) will, cet. par. lead to a reduction in mt + gt, the
total amount spent on education by the private and public sectors combined.
Time spent on education, et,

will also be reduced and the growth rate of

human capital will decline unambiguously.
The intuition is clear:

as a profit maxjmizing firm facing a given wage

and interest rate, the young worker would respond to the in-kind free gift of
gt by reducing his private input of mt one for one.

The free gift of gt'

however, also has an income effect on the young worker as a consumer (see
equation (43) in which gt enters (properly discounted) as a net transfer to
the household on a par with -7! and -7~.

The net result is the more than

100 percent crowding out of private education spending by public spending on
education apparent in the last term on the R.H.S. of equation (45).
If the increase in public spending on the education of a member of
generation t, gt, is financed during period t through borrowing and if the
additional public debt thus incurred is serviced and repaid in periods t+l
and/or t+2 through increased lump-sum taxes on members of that same generation
t, (that is through increases in r! and/or in r~) then of course there will
1
2
not be any change in -gt(l + rt+l- Ot+l - ~t+l) +rt+
rt(l
+ rt+ 2 - Ot+ 2)-1 ·
Absent any income effect from the increase in public spending on education,

the "direct crowding out'' (Buiter [1977]) of private by public spending is of
course exactly one-for-one.
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If the policy aim is to boost human capital formation, this model
suggests that increasing public spending on education while the private sector
still engages in private spending on education, would not be very smart 27 • An
obviously superior policy is the one actually pursued (up to a point) by most
goverliments in the real world: the removal of the education decision from the
realm of private decision making.

Compulsory school attendance up to a··

certain age is indeed the rule in most societies.

It can be checked easily

that with administrative assignment of e and of g and access to
non-distortionary taxes, Pareto-efficient equilibria can be supported.
\Then

the mt

~

0 constraint is binding (which will .only be the case when

gt> 0) , the private optimum is characterized by the following equations:

The equilibrium amount of time spent on education can be solved from
2
rt
1
1
=
rt + 1 +
wt+lht-1
rt+2 -Ot+2

The effect of an increase 1n public spending on education, gt, on private
time spent on education is ambiguous.

The increase in the quantity of the

complementary factor of production gt raises the marginal return to another
hour spent on education.

The income effect, however, goes the other way and

suggests an increase in the demand for leisure.

Even when et declines,
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however, the net effect of the growth rate of human capital is positive.

The

intuition for this is that the positive income effect of the increase in
public spending also raises the demand for cf and c~.

The net.effect of an

increase in gt on h! is therefore positive when the non-negativity constraint
on mt is binding.
Inter-country differences in productivity growth rates disappear when all
inputs into human capital accumulation are tradable.
case by considering the case where a=
into human capital accumulation.

0

We could analyze this

and non-traded time is not an input

The problem with this is that, unless by

chance 1 + rt+l - 0t+l = nwt+l , we will have a corner solution for the traded
human capital accumulation input.

The home country private sector equilibrium

conditions are for this case:
2

2

ct + rt
-,------..---- = 0
1 + rt+2 - 0t+2

-mt(l +

hl = ho
t

t

[:!r

C

lt = h~

mt= 0
=

ro

if 1 + rt+1

Ot+1 - ~t+1 > nwt+l

This knife-edge solution reflects the fact that when a= O, our education
technology is linear in an input which can be purchased at a parametric price
and which does not enter directly into the strictly concave utility function.
*
While in general equilibrium finite values of mt (and mt)
will still be

ensured through the endogeneity of the wage rate and the interest rate, it is
convenient to respecify the human capital accumulation function for the case
where only traded inputs enter as follows:
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0(,\(1.

Vith this strictly concave accumulation function the first order

condition for optimal private choice of mt becomes, when the non-negativity
constraint on mt is not binding
(46 )

l + rt+l - 8t+l - ~t+l
Vith perfect international mobility of financial capital and no

differential source-based taxes on capital rentals, the before-tax interest
rate will be equalized in the world economy.

Vith a common production

function the wage rate (per unit of efficiency labor) will also be equalized
throughout ·the world economy.

Vith a common human capital accumulation

technology (common values of 1/ and,\ in this example), the equilibrium values
of mt+ gt will be the same throughout the world economy.

Taste parameters

*
(such as P and P)
therefore no longer matter for differences in productivity

growth rates.
deficits.

Neither do redistributive lump-sum taxation or public sector

The only aspect of fiscal policy in our model that matters for

growth differentials a.re the tax rates on non-human asset income and student

* ~and~ *) 28 •
loan subsidy rates (0, 0,

Different source-based capital rental

tax rates would cet. par. cause different wages to be generated in the parts
of the world where they apply.

By raising the return to human capital

accumulation a higher home country relative real wage would cet. par. increase
mt and thus the relative growth rate of home country human capital.
Note from equation (46) that a permanently higher subsidy rate on student
loans in the home country (a higher value of ~) will cet. par. be associated
with a permanently higher home country relative growth rate of human capital
and a permanently higher relative rate of growth of output per worker.
increase in the home country tax rate on all saving (subsidy rate on all
borrowing) 0 will have the same effects.

An

38

Also from equation (46), higher public spending on education would cet.
par.

(i.e. without allowing for possible consequences for the world rate of

interest and the wage rate of the financing decisions associated with higher
public spending) only crowd out private spending on education one-for-one:
d(mt

+

gt) =

029.

If the non-negativity constraint mt~ 0 on private expenditure on
education is binding, the government can of course boost the growth rate of
human capital simply by raising gt, its own expenditure on education.
Returning to the general case of O 5 a< 1, it is easy to consider the
difference made by the existence of national source-based taxation (at a rate
~*

0 in the home country and O in the foreign country) of the rental income from
capital instead of national residence-based taxation of the income from all
non-human wealth.

Student loan subsidies are also omitted.

With free

international mobility of financial capital we now have equalization of
after-tax rates of return to physical capital, that is
( 47)

ll'ith source-based capital taxation, perfect capital mobility and a common
technology, the home country wage rate will be above the foreign wage rate if
~*

and only if O is below O • Even if all other private and policy parameters
are identical, different wage rates will be associated with different
productivity growth rates.

In the logarithmic case (1

= "f * = 1)

it is very

easy to see that the country with the higher real wage will have the higher
growth rate of productivity
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(5)

GOVERNMENT BORROWING AND LUMP-SUM INTERGENERATIONAL REDISTRIBUTION:

MUST WHAT HELPS SAVING HURT HUMAN CAPITAL FORMATION?

The budget identity and the solvency constraint (assumed to hold with
strict equality) of the home government (equations (19) and (21a)) together
imply the following present value budget constraint:
2
c2
oo
r1
+ T 2t+I. 2
rt+i-2
[
t+i-2
8 -{ t+i-1
+
0
(48) ht =
2 1 ]
t+l 1 ( ) hi .(l+n) 2 + t+i (l+f'(kt -)
Ot+l)(l+n) ht+i
i =0
ht+i l+n
+l
+l

2

(O

-

m

. 1

) t+l-

.

t+i + ~t+i hi+i(l+n)

1 h1 . (l+n)
IT
t+l
8t +l' =
j=O htl +1. 1 (1+f'(kt +l-))
All this says is that the outstanding value of the public debt should be
equal to the present discounted value of the future primary (non-interest)
public sector budget surplus.es.

Holding constant the path of public spending

on goods and services, a tax cut this period will require a future tax
increase of equal present discounted_ value.

The required tax increase may of

course be spread out over many future periods.
While the competitive equilibria of OLG models such as the one we are
considering may be dynamically inefficient
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we shall consider the

consequences of a cut in lump-sum taxes during period t when the interest rate
is above the growth rate of human capital in each period.

Any government,

acting unilaterally, could issue debt or vary lump-sum taxation to achieve a
national Pareto improvement if dynamic inefficiency prevailed (see Buiter and
Kletzer [1990a, 1990b]).

For simplicity, the distortionary tax rates O and~

and their foreign counterparts O* and~ * are set equal to zero in what
follows, as are domestic and foreign exhaustive public spending g and g* .
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Again all policy changes are perturbations of an initial symmetric
equilibrium.
1
In period t the government can only change rt-l'
the tax on the middle
2 , the tax on the old.
aged, and rt_
Period t human capital formation is
2
performed by the young in that period, that is by generation t. Human capital

formation in period twill only be a function of expectations at time t
concerning r! and

r~.

The behavior of members of _generation t during period t

is therefore only affected by tax changes in period t to the extent that such
changes in r{_1 and r~_2 carry announcement effects concerning r{ and r~, the
taxes they will pay when middle-aged and old. Of course, if the changes in
1 ·
2
rt-land rt_2 are news with respect to the information set of period t-1, then
the saving behavior of the middle-aged in period twill be affected. The
scope for time-inconsistent policy behavior in a model like ours is clearly
considerable.

For reasons of space these issues will not be considered

further.
Any change in the government's policy concerning borrowing and lump-sum
taxes and transfers that increase (reduces) the net life-time fiscal transfer
2
1
rt
to generation t, that is Tt =-[rt+ 1
._
)32 ,will reduce human
+ rt+2 0t+2
capital formation by that generation that period (see equation (43)). ~ill
all policies that achieve an increase in Tt have an unambiguous effect on
national saving in that period or beyond?
Let national financial wealth at the beginning of period t be denoted Jt.
It follows that
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It is clear from equation {45) that an increase in Tt' the net life-time
fiscal transfer to generation twill, by raising life-time resources,
increases the demand for leisure, reduces human capital formation and
therefore reduces mt' the amount of the complementary human capital
accumulation input demanded.

Since the resources to pay for mt have to be

borrowed (student loans), national saving cet. par. increases as a result of
the same fiscal action that reduces human capital formation.

To determine

what will happen in periods beyond t to national saving, we shall consider two
· canonical special cases.
The first change in the borrowing-lump-sum tax/transfer mix is a
permanent balanced budget tax cut in favor of the middle-aged financed by an
increase in taxes on the old.

For simplicity let bt = 0 for all t.

'What this

amounts to is a permanent reduction in the scale of the unfunded social
security retirement scheme.

'When middle-aged each person has a tax cut of

amountµ and when old a tax increase of (1 + n)µ.

That is:

1
1 2
drt
. 1 = µ < 0 for all i ~ -2.
- +1. = -(1 + n)- drt +1The present discounted value of lifetime taxes falling on generation t+i

changes byµ

rt+ 2+1. - n]

[ 1 + rt +2+1·

which is negative if the interest rate exceeds the

rate of growth of population, as we assume.

'With leisure a normal good, this

policy therefore reduces forever more the home country allocation of time to
education and thus the rate of growth of the stock of human capital relative
to that in the rest of the world.

From equation (43) it will forever lower

the growth rate of home country labor productivity relative to the growth rate
of labor productivity in the foreign country.
As noted before, the increase in Tt (for all tin our example) will
reduce mt together with et.

This reduction in financial dissaving by the
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young is reinforced by the middle-aged, for familiar life-cycle reasons.

The

reduction in the size of the home country unfunded social security retirement
scheme will increase saving by the middle aged and therefore raise the total
national stock of non-human assets held by domestic residents (this does not
require the interest rate to be above the population growth rate).
What we have here is an example of the general point that in our model,
permanent changes in the intergenerational distribution of income brought about by
changes in government borrowing, lump-sum taxes and transfers that boost domestic
saving will tend to reduce human capital formation and conversely.

A second example of a similar (negative) permanent effect on human
capital formation and (positive) permanent effect on financial saving is that
of a debt-financed quasi-permanent tax cut for the young: in period tan
(unexpected) one-time tax is levied on the old or the middle-aged.
revenues from this one-time levy are used to retire public debt.

The
For

simplicity assume the outstanding public debt is reduced to zero following the
levy.

The present discounted value of all net future tax receipts too is

therefore reduced to zero.

This "present value tax dividend'' can be

distributed (in many different ways) across generations in such a manner that
the present discounted value of lifetime taxes for all current and future
generations (except the unfortunate current old or middle-aged) is lower.

For

instance, one could give the middle-aged each period after t the same size tax
cut, with the value of the tax cut determined by the requirement that their
present discounted value be equal to the original tax levy in period t.
This policy would clearly raise the permanent income (at given wages and
interest rates) of all generations born in period tor later.

It would

therefore reduce their expenditure of resources on human capital formation and
their borrowing while young to finance human capital formation.

The future
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middle-aged would all increase their saving for life-cycle purposes.

Again,

relative human capital formation and national saving would move in opposite
directions.

(6)

CONCLUSION.

The presence of a non-traded ("home-grown") human capital good which is
an essential input in its own accumulation is sufficient for the existence of
persistent international differentials in levels and growth rates of labor
productivity.

This is true even though there is perfect international

mobility of financial and physical capital and technologies are identical
across the world.
A higher subjective rate of time preference will lower a country's
relative rate of growth by reducing the relative rate of accumulation of human
capital.
A higher public debt burden will, to the extent that it represents a net

intergenerational redistribution towards the old (which will be. the case if
taxes are typically paid by the working generation and public debt is
typically owned by the old), increase the relative growth rate of human
capital and output.

That is, deficit financing policies and lump-sum

intergenerational redistribution policies that boost financial saving will
reduce the relative rate of human capital accumulation and the relative growth
rate of labor productivity.
In the tradition of Uzawa [1965] and Lucas [1988], the human capital
accumulation process involves positive external effects.

A first-best policy

towards human capital accumulation requires subsidies to education or, in our
model, a tax on leisure or a wage subsidy.

The same result can of course also
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be achieved command-style, that is through administrative assignment of time
and resources spent on schooling, overriding individual choice.

Improvements

over the unassisted decentralized equilibrium that fall short of full Pareto
efficiency are achieved by subsidizing private borrowing for educational
expenditure (student loans).
Vhen public spending on education is neither more not less efficient than
private spending, an increase in public spending on education will crowd out
private spending more than one-to-one, unless the income effect of the public
transfer in kind for the generation receiving it is offset by increases in
taxes.
A higher subsidy rate to student loans will raise the relative growth
rate of productivity and a higher source-based tax on capital income will
lower it.

Residence-based taxes will in addition affect world-wide

productivity growth through their effect on the world rate of interest. They
affect the productivity growth differential only through its differential effect
on the cost of borrowing to finance private educational expenditures.
in source-based taxes also affect global saving.

Changes

They have a differential

effect on productivity growth by altering relative wages.
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FOOTNOTES

lThe terms labor productivity, output per worker, output per person hour
and output per capita will be used interchangeably.
2'fhese models themselves are 2-country versions either of Diamond's famous
2-period Samuelsonian OLG model with a neoclassical production function
·
(Diamond [1965]) or of the Yaari-Blanchard-Weil OLG model. Another example is
Chang [1990].
·
3Alogoskoufis and van der Ploeg [1990a,b] contain the first applications
(that we know of) of the OLG private consumption specification to endogenous
~rowth. Unlike our model which uses the (3-period variant of the) Samuelson
L1958] OLG model, Alogoskoufis and van der Ploeg use the Yaari-Blanchard-Weil
version of the OLG model. At the same Tokyo Conference at which an early
version of this paper was presented, Alogoskoufis and van der Ploeg also
presented a two-country OLG endogenous growth model with perfect international
capital mobility. Because their model does not have an essential non-traded
growth input, it implies convergent growth rates (Alogoskoufis and van der
Ploeg (1991]) .
4Qther papers analyzing the consequences of the use of distortionary taxes
in (closed) endogenous growth models are Rebelo [1990], King and Rebelo [1990]
and Barro and Sala i Martin [1990a]. The latter also consider productive
public spending. Jones and Manuelli [1990] analyze an infinite-lived
representative agent version of the open economy endogenous growth model with
distortionary taxes.
5Examples include Grossman and Helpman [1989a,b,c,d; 1990] and
Feenstra [1990].
6In the macroeconomic literature Lucas [1988, pp.14-17] recognizes and
emphasizes the importance of factor mobility assumptions for the predictions
of neo-classical growth theory. It is equally important for endogenous growth
theory with non-increasing returns (of which our paper is an example) and for
endogenous growth theory with increasing returns.
7We should note that Grossman and Helpman [1990] do allow trade in
intermediate goods in a model in which technological knowledge concerning new
types of intermediate goods is costlessly and instantaneously transferable
between countries. The externality associated with the creation of this new
knowledge is also global. However, the technologies for producing
intermediate and final goods are not identical. The concept of comparative
advantage therefore has meaning in their model. In their other work dealing
with two-country endogenous growth there also is assumed to be a difference
between the technologies for producing new knowledge. Knowledge transfer is
non-instantaneous and sometimes costly. See Grossman and Helpman [1989a, b, c
and d]. Feenstra f1990] develops a two-country endogenous growth model in
which there js no tinancial capital mobility or technology transfer. Quah and
Rauch [1990] also consider trade in intermediate goods in an endogenous growth
model. Young [1989] considers a two-country endogenous growth model in which
immobile labor is the only factor of production in both countries and in which
there is no international borrowing and lending. Technologies differ
initially between the two countries and will not necessarily converge, even
asymptotically.
Bllhat we say about convergence or divergence of national productivity
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levels can apply to any sub~unit of the global economy. In most of
international trade theory the label "nation" does double duty. It defines
the set of agents under the political jurisdiction of a particular government
(and thus subject to its taxes, regulations, tariffs etc); it is at the same
time used to define the domain of mobility of certain economic agents, factors
of production and their owners and -other inputs (e.g. cultural attitudes
·
towards lying, bribery, shirking, finking etc.). It is clear that the
relevant domain of a particular agent, factor of production or cultural trait
need not coincide with the political definition of the nation state. The
relevant domain or region can be a subset of the national economy, can contain
the national economy or can have an intersection with the national economy
that is non-empty but less that the union of the two.
9\'hat we say about convergence or divergence of national productivity
levels can apply to any sub-unit of the global economy. In most of
international trade theory the label "nation" does double duty. It defines
the set of agents under the political jurisdiction of a particular government
(and thus subject to its taxes, regulations, tariffs etc); it is at the same
time used to define the domain of mobility of certain economic agents, factors
of production and their owners and other inputs (e.g. cultural attitudes
towards lying, bribery, shirking, finking etc.). It is clear that the
relevant domain of a particular agent, factor of production or cultural trait
need not coincide with the political definition of the nation state. The
relevant domain or region can be a subset of the national economy, can contain
the national economy or can have an intersection with the national economy
that is non-empty but less that the union of the two.
tO\Je shall use the short-hand expression "decreasing returns to
reproducible factors" to mean that the production function is homogeneous of
degree less than unity in reproducible factors of production.
11By models with constant returns to reproducible or augmentable inputs we
mean those endogenous growth models that do not have scale effects entering
into the determination of the equilibrium growth rate. Endogenous growth can
of course be obtained in such models even without constant returns to the
reproducible inputs. All that is required is that the Inada conditions be
violated in such a way that the marginal product of reproducible inputs be
bounded sufficiently far away from zero even when the ratio of reproducible to
non-reproducible inputs increases without bound. The endogenous growth models
we shall consider achieve this despite the Inada conditions being satisfied,
by having constant returns to reproducible inputs at the level of the
aggregate national production function. By models with decreasing returns to
reproducible inputs we mean models for which the Inada conditions are
satisfied and the production function is homogeneous of degree less than unity
in reproducible inputs. The steady state growth rate of labor productivity
(if a steady state exist) is exogenous and equal to the exogenous rate of
labor-augmenting (or Harrod neutral) technical change.
12Recent examples of studies that investigate national differences in per
capita output levels and growth rates using as (one of) the technological ·
mainta.ined hypotheses the constant or decreasing returns to augmentable
factors of production model and the common global technology of production
include the empirical studies of Barro [1989a,b], King and Rebelo [1989],
Benhabib and Jovanovic [1989] and Cohen [1990]. For more on the facts on
convergence see Baumol [1986] and Baumol, Blackman and \'olff [1987]. Easterly
[1989] has a technology that can exhibit increasing returns to scale but

51

focuses on the case of constant returns to reproducible factors and either a
constant value for the irreproducible factor or independence of output from
the irreproducible factor in steady state. In Easterly [1990] the model is
simplified to exhibit constant returns to reproducible factors. Irreproducible
factors play no role. Finally, Edwards [1989] develops and tests a simple model of
growth in developing countries in which the assumption o{ access to a common global
technology is abandoned. It is replaced by one of gradual catching up by a
technologically backward nation to the higher external level of technology. The rate
at which a country catches up is postulated to be an increasing function of the
.degree of external orientation in the country's international trade relations.
Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1990] use a model without factor mobility to analyze
convergence of growth rates among regions within a nation state (the states of the
USA). They recognize that this framework is unrealistic for countries and especially
for the U.S. states and note that extensions of the neoclassical growth model that
allow for features of an open economy tend to speed up the predicted rate of
convergence.
t3In a companion paper to the current one, '"'e consider a
Yaari-Blanchard-Weil OLG model to study the same range of issues analyzed in
this .paper. In that model, the current stock of human capital can be
allocated to leisure, to current production or to further human capital
accumulation. See Buiter and Kletzer [19911. The closed economy yersion of
an endogenous grol.'th model l.'ith the Yaari-Blanchard-Weil OLG structure is
analyzed in Alogoskoufis and van der Ploeg [1990a,b].
As pointed out to us by Olivier Blanchard, dynamic inefficiency can never
occur, regardless of the specification of the consumption side of the model,
'"hen there is a production function such as the one used in Alogoskoufis and
van der Ploeg, in '"'hich aggregate output is linear in the aggregate physical
capital stock. When Y = AK, A> O, the marginal product of capital, MPK, is
constant and equal to A, l.'hich is also the average product of capital. In a
closed system, ouput per unit of capital is obviously never less than capital
formation per unit of capital, '"'hich equals ouput per unit of capital minus
the sum of private and public consumption per unit of capital. A necessary
condition for the occurrency of dynamic inefficiency is obviously that the
marginal product of capital be able to fall belo'"' the average .Product. This
is ruled out l.'hen output is linear in the physical capital stock. Note that A
need not be constant for this argument to hold, but only independent of K.
Let C denote aggregate private consumption and G aggregate public
consumption. Without loss of generality, capital consumption is ignored. It
follo'"'s that, in a closed economy, since C, G ~ O, '"'e have

Our specification of the production function has constant returns to the
tw? reproducible factors (physical and human capital) _together but less than
unitary returns to each of the two factors of production separately. The
marginal product of each of the tl.'o factors of production is belo'"' its average
product and is endogenous. Dynamic inefficiency is therefore in principle
possible in our model.
14 If increasing returns are internal to the individual firm (that
is if
returns to scale are increasing in productive inputs that can be varied at the
level of the individual firm) and if they are unbounded, then no competitive
equilibrium can exist.
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t5In an interesting recent paper, Caballero and Lyons [1989] find limited
evidence in US manufacturing industry of internal increasing returns (at the
two-digit level), but strong evidence of external economies, that is economies
external at the two-digit level but internal at the level of the US economy.
16For a recent opposing view see Romer [1986].
17Jt should be noted that Romer' s "replication postulate" may not be
universally accepted by physical scientists as "the most basic premise of our
scientific reasoning". It has a distinct pre-Quantum Theory flavor. While
economics is still pretty much Newtonian as a science (or even pre-Newtonian,
that is Keplerian as regards theory and pre-Tycho Brahean as regards empirical
observation) one should be careful in one's assertions about what real
scientists believe.
A fundamental property of the quantum world is that one cannot, even in
principle, measure precisely both the momentum and the position of a particle
at the same time. It is often explained in physical terms, that the act of
measuring the position of a particle disturbs its momentum and vice versa.
One implication is what Einstein referred to as a "spooky action at a
distance", a communication between two particles even when they are far apart,
so that particle A can be disturbed by the measurement made on particle B.
Einstein had trouble with this, as it seemed to mean that the communication
traveled faster than light. However, it is consistent with the experimental
evidence (the test of Bell's inequality). It also makes a hash of the
replication postulate.
18" An input in production is rival if its use by one person or firm
precludes its use by another" (Romer [1990b]). A completely non-rival good is
one whose use by one person or firm in no way precludes its use by another. A
good can be partly rival or even super non-rival: its use by one firm or
person may enhance its availability for use by others. The use of a certain
class of objects as a medium of exchange and means of payment may have this
feature: my willingness to accept payment in a certain potential medium of
exchange increases when the currency is used more widely. Starrett [1988]
contains a very clear discussion of the subject.
t9Ve assume that 1 + rt+l - Ot+l - ~t+l and 1 + rt+ 2 - Ot+ 2 are positive.
From our assumptions about the production technology (given below) it follows
that r > 0. The restriction that gross after-tax rates of return be positive
is therefore a restriction on permissible fiscal policy.
20 An example of such a function would be the following generalization of
equation (14)
a (
)1-a-6 6
ec
et mt+ gt
gt
= 11--------0 ~a~ 1; 0 ~ 6 < 1; 1/ > 0
,p( :-0'
ht
ho
t
Note that this permits the marginal productivity of public spending on
education to be greater than (6 > 0), equal to (6 = 0) or less than (6 < 0)
the marginal productivity of private spending on education.
21Yhile with perfect international capital mobility a single government can
achieve world-wide dynamic efficiency, both governments can choose (balanced
or unbalanced-budget) intergenerational redistribution schemes using Jump-sum
taxes and transfers to achieve this (Buiter and Kletzer [1990b]).
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221n continu.ous time -rt = dlnilt = dlnhi - dlnf(kt) and
*
*
*1
*
1
*1
-rt= dlnilt = dlnht dlnf(kt). Therefore -rt - -rt= dlnht - dlnht .
23The assumptions which have been made explicitly or implicitly,
that population growth rates and labor force participation rates are
_exogenous, are of course not the strongest point of the paper.
24Note that u will be a function of the parameters of the model.
25Note that without intergenerational redistributive policy
1
2
-1
*1
*2
* -1
:
(rt+ rt(l + rt+2 - ot+2) = Tt + Tt (1 + rt+2 - ot+2) = 0), the growth
rate of home country output per worker exceeds that of the foreign country if
and only if the home country discount factor P exceeds that of the foreign
* · This is true in and out
country P.
of steady state.
26Ve assume that 1 + rt+l - Ot+l - ~t+l and 1 + rt+ 2 - Ot+ 2 are positive.
From our assumptions about the production technology (given below) it follows
that r > 0. The restriction that gross after-tax rates of return be positive
is therefore a restriction on permissible fiscal policy.
27Clearly, one would have to take a disaggregated view of the matter and
allow for heterogeneity within generations in the real world. Even if average
private spending on education is positive, there may be many induviduals
spending nothing on education.
2BThe conclusion that, with common values of O and~ in the two countries,
there would be convergence (in our model instantaneous equality) of
productivity growth rates when a= 0 remains correct also if A= 1 (when the
growth rate of per capita human capital is linear in m + g).
29In the framework of this paper, any consequences of lump-sum financing of
,say, increased home country public spending on education would affect
domestic and foreign interest rates and wage rates equally. This would
therefore not alter productivity growth differentials.
30This result follows through also for the constant elasticity of marginal
utility case.
aisee footnote 12 for a discussion of how certain other endogenous growth
models can never exhibit dynamic inefficiency.
32An alternative definition of the net fiscal transfer to generation t
would be
.
-[ri + r~(l + rt+ 2 - Ot+ 2)-l - gt(l + rt+l - Ot+l)]. llhen a< 1 (and the
non-negativity constraint on private educational expenditures (mt~ 0) is not
binding), the transfer of educational services to a member of generation t,
gt, can be viewed as income-in-kind, but it will clearly not be a lump-sum
transfer.

